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Where airports were once the sole responsibility of their governments, liberalisation of 
economies has seen administrative interests in airport spaces divested increasingly towards 
market led authority.  Extant literature suggests that actions in decision spaces can be described 
under broad idealised forms of governance. However in looking at a sample of 18 different 
airports it is apparent that these classic models are insufficient to appreciate the contextual 
complexity of each case.  Issues of institutional arrangements, privatisation, and management 
focus are reviewed against existing governance modes to produce a model for informing 
privatisation decisions, based on the contextual needs of the individual airport and region.  
Expanding governance modes to include emergent airport arrangements both contribute to the 
existing literature, and provides a framework to assist policy makers and those charged with the 
operation of airports to design effective governance models.  In progressing this framework, 
contributions are made to government decision makers for the development of new, or review of 
existing strategies for privatisation, while the private sector can identify the intent and 
expectations of privatisation initiatives to make better informed decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
As gateways to regions, airports have been promoted primarily as logistics hubs, and have 
become focal points for regional development through the fostering of economic growth and 
attractiveness (Vickerman, Spiekermann and Wegener 1999; Kasarda 2001; Charles, Barnes, Ryan 
and Clayton 2007).  Airports were traditionally seen as the responsibility of governments to 
manage and operate, typically in line with strategic economic and defence policies.  Increasingly, 
countries are pursuing strategies to liberalise airports divesting, to varying extents, operational 
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and economic risks and control.  With interests to maximise airport development and regional 
benefits, governments face an increasingly disparate set of interests (Pitt 2001).  Governments 
have increasingly sought private funding in airport development as a means to progress 
infrastructure development or build efficiency in operations (Graham 2003; Szyliowicz and Goetz 
1995).  Privatisation has effectively reduced governments’ ability to control airport spaces 
directly, yet contemporary planning strategies show an increased need for coordinating 
development efforts between airports and their regions (Alexander 1998; Kasarda 2001; Blanton 
2004).  So governments seek private funding for airport development to achieve regional 
planning goals, but risk losing the ability to actively coordinate future airport development to fit 
regional economic development plans. 
Privatisation provides a ready source of funding for airports, especially where governments lack 
expertise or the necessary budgetary requirements to undertake a major airport overhaul.  
Increased competitiveness in the air industries has applied pressure on airports to become more 
mobile to change, making it necessary for airports to now sit separate of the prohibitive checks 
and balances required of government authorities (Kay and Thompson 1986).  There are many 
different strategies that governments can take to enhance the strategic mobility of their airports.  
Each method available has its own inherent benefits and limitations to the operation and 
administration of airports, and also changes the governance arena for airport decision making. 
Understanding governance is essential to drawing further light on the decision making processes 
surrounding privatisation.  Contemporary forms of government have allowed for the market to 
enter the decision making space of airport development, from active engagement in planning 
(Goetz and Szyliowicz 1997) to effectively full ownership and operation (Bovaird 2005; Graham 
2003).  Many governments no longer retain the authority to control the development initiatives 
within airports.  Governments act, instead, in a relationship with their airports to achieve long-
term regional planning goals, steering and guiding development at arms length (Stoker 1998).   
While governance can readily be defined as the way in which society is organised, and includes 
the rule structures of inclusiveness, accountability, authority, legitimacy and reciprocity (Rhodes 
2007), the privatisation of airports makes for a fuzzy governance ‘space’ where different 
governance modes intersect and overlap. Privatised airports are expected to compete and strive 
for efficiencies based on market based concerns, while broader more regional issues require 
hierarchical oversight from governments, ensuring safety and health for airport users and 
neighbours. 
How each actor responds to decisions made is dependant on their perceptions of how legitimacy 
is gained (Tyler 1990; Chayes and Shelton 2000), which more importantly, is influenced by their 
governance structure (Thorelli 1986; Jones et al. 1997; Rhodes 2007).  Where governance modes 
overlap and interact with each other, inconsistencies appear in the interpretations and responses 
to issues of decision making (Black 2008); these decision making spaces of overlapping and 
sometimes competing governance structures are defined as crowded policy domains (Keast, 
Mandell and Brown 2006).  Changing the levels of state ownership, authority, and operational 
control over airports highlights the difficulties that arise in crowded policy domains.  Traditional 
relationships of government agencies as airport administrators have changed to government 
agencies acting as overseers of airport administrators and operators (Graham 2003), and as 
stakeholders in shared control of airport operations (Stevens 2007).  Shared control and multiple 
interests in airport decision making is a major source of complexity in reviewing the governance 
of airports. 
Previously, authors have highlighted the different levels of privatisation, authority, and 
ownership stemming from strategies to enhance the effectiveness of airports for their regions 
(Graham 2003; Carney and Mew 2003).  Individually, each contribution has been an important 
step to highlighting the complexity of governance in airport arenas; an evolving space in 
literature as governments and airports continue to liberalise.  To manage the increasing 
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complexity surrounding the privatisation of airports, a better understanding of the impacts and 
implications of different privatisation methods is required.  By merging governance theory with 
the concepts of airport privatisation (Graham 2003), airport management strategy (Carney and 
Mew 2003) and models of airport administration and operation (Stevens 2007) a theoretical 
framework has been developed to provide clarity on what privatisation sets in operational 
expectations and administration.  The framework has been applied to 18 airports of varying 
levels of privatisation, with initial findings matching expectations from the literature.  The 
conceptual framework provided is at an early stage of development.  However the utility of such 
a tool is clear in helping decision makers revise what they want, how they want it, how it is now, 
and how that meets the expectations of ‘typical’ applications of privatization.  In progressing this 
framework, contributions are made to government decision makers for the development of new, 
or review of existing strategies for privatisation, while the private sector can identify the intent 
and expectations of privatisation initiatives to make better informed decisions. 
1.1 Airport Privatisation 
Many airports have been privatised to some extent, from the use of contracted agents to service 
and maintain terminals, through to the whole of airport operations and administration with sale 
and long term lease arrangements (Graham 2003).  In privatising their airports, governments 
have often made decisions on the needs of the regional economy; some have been positive in 
delivering enhanced business relationships and airport performance (Gerber 2002), while others 
have seen a litany of unrealistic expectations and failures (Lipovich 2008), or government 
responses too late to be of value (Pitt 2001). 
Table 1. Graham’s (2003) five modes of privatisation 
Privatisation mode Typical attributes 
Share Flotation Full or partial sale of airport through the issue and trade of share capital, 
but can also include long-term leasing (50+ years).  This includes 
responsibility for airport development, operations and administration. 
Trade Sale Full or partial sale to trade partner or investing consortium, often 
strategically chosen for expertise rather than just available financial capital.  
This includes responsibility for airport development, and operations. 
Concession Mid- to short-term leasing arrangement (20-30 years) for airport operations.  
This includes responsibility for airport development and operation; 
however the influence of government is higher due to the shorter length of 
the lease. 
Project Finance Often manifests as a buy-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangement for a private 
entity to refurbish/develop and run an airport facility for a set length of 
time.  Investment can range from the redevelopment of a single passenger 
terminal through to an entirely new airport.  Such arrangements often 
range in length (up to approximately 30 years), the bigger the project the 
longer the operational agreement. 
Management Contract A contract for the day-to-day operations of the airport.  The operating 
company does not have control over the development of the airport, and 
responsibilities may include the operation of the entire airport down to a 
single operational aspect such as retail or parking. 
 
The literature has defined the varying extents to which airports have privatised since the end of 
the Second World War (Tretheway 2001; Graham 2003; Wells and Young 2004).  Through various 
modes and levels of privatisation, many airports have gained substantial autonomy from their 
governments, effectively given the authority to develop and govern the land they inhabit 
(Graham 2003; Humphreys 1999). The authority given to airports is not necessarily absolute or 
uncontested, and with various methods available for governments to privatise their airports, 
different sources and levels of influence exist in airport governance arenas.  A brief outline of 
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Graham’s (2003) perspective of airport privatisation is given above in table 1, with ‘share 
flotation’ being the most liberalised method, through to ‘management contract’ allowing 
governments to retain almost complete control.  Graham elaborates on her modes of 
privatisation, unpacking the impacts privatisation has on competition between airports at the 
national levels, stressing the importance of a well considered strategy to privatise airports (2003, 
27). 
While Graham’s (2003) five modes provide an overview or categorising of how governments 
have approached airport privatisation in reality there are many, more subtle, variations of airport 
privatisation within each mode.  A review of the ownership structures utilised for airport 
privatisation provides valuable background for identifying and considering the underlying 
economic drivers to airport decision making.  The following sub-section looks beyond the modes 
of airport privatisation to show the differences in underlying decision making values for different 
models of airport operation and administration. 
1.2 Airport Operation and Administration 
Today, the nature of airport ownership varies greatly from country to country.  The majority of 
airports globally are still public assets, with varying levels of private sector involvement.  A 
number of models of airport administration and operation are documented by Tretheway 2001, 
Graham 2003, and Wells and Young 2004. Stevens (2007) summarises these documented models 
of control as ranging from the direct steering of National Government Departments, Municipal 
Governments and Government Agencies to more arms length models of Government 
Corporations, Airport Authorities and Private Corporations. Stevens’ (2007) summary shows just 
how complex state level arrangements can be for airports, and provides a complimentary 
addition to the levels of privatisation provided by Graham (2003). 
Providing clarity on where authority and responsibility lies is an important step in any decision 
making process.  Privatised airports have a responsibility to facilitate investor returns for both 
future growth and attractiveness, while governments have a responsibility to ensure regional and 
community sustainability.  The differences in underlying responsibilities and accountability for 
airport administrators are likely to have very real impacts on decisions made at the airport 
management level.  For example, fully privatised airports have a definite need to pursue 
economically sustainable practices and/or development, which differs from government owned 
and operated airports that have access to tax revenues generated beyond the airport fence. To 
identify the dynamic issues that underpin airport managerial decisions, the following sub-section 
highlights the critical issues that drive the airport decision making. 
1.3 Managerial Intent and Privatisation 
Carney and Mew (2003) expand on economic issues by offering three optimal governance modes 
for airport privatisation, and is essentially a grouping of Graham’s (2003) five privatisation 
modes into strategic, operational, and project based managerial foci.  This simplification, 
however, groups the privatisation modes into three groups of arrangements that are bound by a 
standard context, time (Carney and Mew 2003).  This contextual anchor allows foresight into the 
operational goals of the private entity; the longer the time horizon, the less transactional the 
relationships between the airport and the government will be (Madhok and Tallman 1998).  For 
example, a company contracted to manage an airport’s operations for the next 5-10 years will 
likely drill down on costs and aim for improved efficiencies over building new systems and 
infrastructure, due to lead times and the available period to seek returns on investment.  A 
company awarded a 99 year lease is likely to invest early for longer term returns on operational 
capacities and economies of scale, which is likely to require support from local governments to 
facilitate planning approval.  It is important to realise that airports are likely to pursue multiple 
managerial foci in their management, however underlying themes in actions made, and 
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constraints built into arrangements and local governance are likely to make one dominant over 
others. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
The central theme from the above sections is the wide array of approaches currently utilised for 
airport privatisation and administration.  No one approach can be singled out as the ‘best’ or 
‘worst’ for airport management, as the decision to (or not to) privatise an airport is based on a 
diverse spread of issues, from political to economic, from opportunistic to strategic. While many 
decisions to (or not to) privatise airports appear to be reasonably effective in achieving their 
initial goals, some outcomes appear to have been less than desirable. 
Decisions made in airport privatisation will be affected fundamentally by underlying 
government legislation, history of privatisation, the desired role of the airport, and the 
availability of funding and expertise (Graham 2003).  More importantly, the negotiation process 
between government and airport operators bidding for tenure may deliver concessions and 
alternatives, as disparate agendas of profit versus providing a public service are explored for 
each actor.  To help identify these dissimilar agendas, Carney and Mew’s (2003) strategic, 
operational and project based perspectives build a strong rationale for airport privatisation 
decisions made by government to consider the contextual fit of governance arrangements to the 
desired outcomes of the privatisation initiative.  Building on this conceptual footing, linking 
airport management focus and governance accountability provides a basis for mapping the 
different strategies or levels of privatisation in Figure 1; unpacking Carney and Mew’s (2003) and 
Graham’s (2003) perspectives of privatisation and strategy against models of governance. 
By showing the levels of accountability against appropriate management focuses, a guide to 
likely modes of privatisation and governance decisions has been provided below for 
governments, privatised, and private organisations.  The modes of privatisation have been 
defined below in Table 2 by pulling together Graham’s (2003) five modes of privatisation, and 
Stevens’ (2007) insights to ownership.  The options for airport privatisation have been arranged 
according to their level of influence (or distance) from the government arena; Government 
Owned representing an airport centrally owned and operated under government control, to 
Stakeholder arrangements representing wholly privatised airports that are steered by arms 
length regulation and industry policy. 
Table 2. Modes of airport privatisation 
Privatisation mode Level of government influence 
Government Owned  Central to decision making Government Owned Company (GOC) 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
Decisions are a mixture of direct government and 





Fully Privatised/Long-Term Leasing (Stakeholders)
  Decisions are bound by regulated limits 
 
Combining the themes from Carney and Mew’s (2003) ideas of managerial focus with the 
implications of ownership on accountability and governance, Figure 1 maps out the above (Table 
2) privatisation modes against the expected loci of accountability and governance.  The created 
framework shows each arrangement’s expectations for managerial focus, governance and 
accountability, with time context added to represent Carney and Mew’s (2003) generalisations of 
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the expected time horizons for each type of ‘contracted’ arrangement.  It is envisioned that the 
utility of the framework is in cross-checking expectations of privatisation outcomes with the 
accountability structures necessary to achieve the desired outcomes.  Governments can keep 
decision processes in check to ensure a good fit of governance mode and privatisation against the 
context of what they are actually trying to achieve.  In other words, choosing the right mode of 
privatisation for what is trying to be achieved in a particular airport case or regional airport 
strategy.  Privatised airports can also use this framework to identify appropriate contractual 
and/or relational arrangements for on-airport development or operations related activities.  
Likewise private sector organisations bidding for contracts can use this framework as a 
complimentary tool for analysing the appropriateness of the proposed arrangement.   
The categories of the framework are not mutually exclusive of one another, and exist as a guide 
of expectations from literature.  An airport may be privatised to be operated by a private 
company, yet the stakeholders be purely of government such as Amsterdam Airport Schiphol; in 
this case accountability is both to stakeholders and to public through the directly apparent role of 
the stakeholders. Likewise an airport operator is likely to have competencies in more than just a 
single management focal area, such as Brisbane Airport; in this case the airport operator may be 
seen as focused towards both project and strategic management arenas due to its current 
schedule of infrastructure developments and its long-term leasing agreement with the Australian 
Government. In such a case the authors consider that, even though an airport operator may have 
a diverse range of issues to address at any one time, a single management foci will still be a 
dominant feature of airport decision making (much like Keast et al’s (2006) ideas of dominant 
governance modes in crowded domains). 
 
Figure 1. Focus, governance and accountability framework for airport privatisation arrangements 
 
While the framework may be used as a tool to assist decisions for each party in the consideration 
and negotiation process for privatisation, disparate agendas will continue to provide unexpected 
and sometimes innovative alternatives to proposed arrangements.  This is a limitation to any tool 
such as the above framework, as it is unable to address issues stemming from individual cases’ 
cultural differences in expectations of accountability, reactions of actors to market forces, or the 
strategic role of an airport as a part of a broader regional/national system.  Looking at a sample 
of 18 airports, Figure 2 maps out the management role of different airport operators; most cases 
appear to be representative of the proposed framework, although there are a number of outliers. 
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18 airports were purposively sampled for their apparent differences in privatisation based on 
assumptions made from the literature.  Purposive sampling was particularly useful in this study 
as it ensured that all of the modes of privatisation described in Section 1.4 were represented.  
Airport cases were selected from a database listing a diverse set of operations, development, 
ownership and land use data for 85 airports from around the world.  Some cases have since been 
identified as pertaining to more than one mode of privatisation in their recent histories, however 
this was not anticipated when originally selecting the cases. Not all of the modes of privatisation 
are represented equally, which is a result of pragmatic concerns for the availability of data and 
the time involved to research each airport case.  
The study was based around desk research for each of the selected airport cases.  The research 
methods included a documentary analysis of annual reports, master plans, government 
documents, and academic literature to catalogue the actions and arrangements for each airport’s 
operations, ownership, administration and development.  Using Carney and Mew’s (2003) 
understanding of managerial focus as a lens to view the catalogued data, interpretations were 
made to define the dominant managerial focus, dominant accountability and governance mode 
for each airport case. Table 3 (see Appendix) provides a summary of the interpreted data for the 
18 airports.  
In practice, all three management areas of strategy, project and operation are utilized 
simultaneously, and the diverse mix of stakeholders involved with the more liberalized forms of 
privatization create multiple sources of accountability.  To map an airport on the framework, it is 
up to the analyser to interpret an airport’s situation against the framework, looking for trends, 
actions and behaviours of airports.  When an airport falls outside of the expectations set from 
literature, it is important to explore reasons as to how and why an airport sits where it does, and 
some initial explorations into some outliers have been discussed in the data analysis and 
discussions sections.  Likewise if an airport is considered to be problematic, yet falls inside of the 
expected regions of the framework, investigating how and why is also required. 
By gaining an understanding of the individual cases, this knowledge was then used to place each 
airport on the framework provided in Figure 2.  Where there had been changes in privatisation, 
such as completion of contracts, expropriation, or renegotiation of contractual agreement, a solid 
line was used to represent the change.  Dashed lines were used to highlight suggested changes 
described in the data analysis section that follows. 
4. Data Analysis 
Table 3 in the Appendix provides the summarised managerial focus and governance mode data 
for the 18 airports reviewed, and most of the airport cases match with expectations set from 
literature.  For example, Beijing Capital International Airport (PEK) is run by a government 
controlled company, has a long history of development coordinated with local and regional 
growth strategies, and is highly accountable to the public sector for its performance to meet 
economic and social growth concerns.  Interpreted, PEK is governed by a dominantly hierarchical 
system, closely tied to central government agendas, with a dominantly strategic management 
focus that aligns the growth of the airport with the growth of the region (see Figure 2 for position 
on the framework).  The position of PEK on the framework sits close to the expected position of 
any GOC; dominantly hierarchical in governance due to close ties to a central agency, and 
strategic in managerial focus to meet longer-term needs identified from within and beyond the 
airport fence due to its strong accountability to the public sector. 
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Figure 2. Study airports’ focus, governance and accountability 
 
While each individual airport case provides and interesting story, when the airports are grouped 
by their dominant management focus a number of themes become apparent that do not 
necessarily fit with the expectations of literature.  The following sub-sections discuss the themes 
evident within each focal area. 
4.1 Strategic 
The majority of airports studied were heavily influenced by strategic management concerns 
which is not surprising due to the nature of airports; they are often referred to as strategic 
infrastructures by governments. The more government influenced airports appeared more 
focused on coordinating their development with the development of their surrounding region, 
integrating development with the broader regional economic system.  The more heavily 
privatised airports appear to pursue similar growth and development strategies to those more 
centrally influenced.  However the role of supply and demand has a stronger influence on the 
ability of privatised airports to sustain development through slower economic periods, placing 
more emphasis to return from growth strategies to optimising strategies as seen in the case of 
Auckland (AKL). 
It is not surprising that the privatised airports are more influenced by external market forces, nor 
that more centralised airports are able to sustain development throughout slow economic times 
and speed up development to meet regional agendas (AMS and PEK are prime examples).  What 
is surprising though is the high level of attention given to stakeholders beyond the airport 
ownership and operations arena for highly privatised airports.  Reading through annual reports 
and strategy documents shows a strong consideration for highly privatised airports, such as 
Brisbane (BNE) and Auckland (AKL), to actively seek inputs from not only the airport users but 
from their airport neighbours. 
The network or group of airport neighbours appears to include community groups, local 
businesses and infrastructure users, and local government agencies (not related to aviation).  This 
is likely due to privatised airports having to rely on their surrounding regions to provide the 
economic impetus for growth, and for external government agencies to approve new 
infrastructure developments within and around airports.  Poor relationships between airports 
and their neighbours have previously been seen to lead to highly negative outcomes, such as tall 
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buildings built under flight paths, which for Boston’s Logan International Airport (not a part of 
this study) has severely limited its options for future capacity growth. By engaging with their 
neighbours in a meaningful way, privatised airports can manage the tensions between 
stakeholders to improve confidence in pursuing their business strategy.  
4.2 Project 
Airports with a project management focus are dominated by hybrid arrangements between 
governments and the private sector.  Again, this is not surprising due to the trend for 
governments to seek funding for large infrastructure projects from the private sector (Kettl 2000). 
An outlier in the project management space is Pudong (PVG).  The airport’s short history has 
already seen it grow rapidly to become one of China’s leading freight hubs.  It’s rapid 
development and ongoing expansion requires considerable expenditure, and is likely the result 
of two emergent needs: 1) meeting new capacity demands for the recent Beijing Olympics, and 2) 
the region’s ongoing economic success requiring an enduring expansion to aviation capacity.  It is 
likely that the centralised nature of the Chinese government led to the decision to take on the 
airport’s development without privatising, but the situation might also imply that in times of 
great need for a certain outcome, government led development may be the best option. 
The more privately influenced airports do not have a great showing in this study, which may be a 
result of the relatively small sample size of airports studied, but is more likely to be influenced by 
development often being part of a larger strategic management agenda for long-term returns. 
Previously mentioned airports for Brisbane (BNE) and Auckland (AKL) both have extensive 
development agendas but as part of a strategy to meet long-term goals. Dusseldorf (DUS) stands 
out as an airport that actively engages its external stakeholders to ensure its decisions to develop 
new infrastructure are optimised to supply/demand forces and also to stakeholder needs.  This 
approach may be to ensure profits are captured quickly through smaller developments to meet 
short- to mid-term market fluctuations, and retain airport customers by ensuring their needs 
have been identified and met. 
A significant outlier in the sample of airports studied is that of Buenos Aires (AEP), which was a 
part of a large 30 year managing contract awarded to Aeroportuertos Argentinos 2000 (Lipovich 
2008), and included the refurbishment of a number of airports around Argentina and the 
management of their ongoing operations.  This level of ambitious development is aligned with 
the time expectations of project focused airport privatisation, however the expectations of highly 
streamlined operations set in the contractual arrangements made the agreement appear more of a 
managed contract than a concessionaire or PPP.  This split of management interests cannot 
necessarily be held to blame for the eventual failure of AA2000 to meet its contractual obligations.  
It may provide, however, a supporting explanation to the inability of the company to maintain 
adequate supervision and/or expertise of both operations and project management to the group 
of airports.   
After the failure of AA2000 to service its contract was identified, the Argentine government 
sought to regain control of the underperforming airport network; lengthy negotiations saw the 
government settle for a 20% stake in AA2000 after accepting losses incurred by the company 
(Lipovich 2008).  This new arrangement sees the AEP operated by a company resembling a PPP, 
more in line with the time and management expectations from literature, with the emphasis on 
improving facilities through privatisation.  This approach is not as ambitious as the previous 
attempt to improve both facilities and streamline operational efficiency at the same time, but is 
does allow for airport management to focus on the task at hand.   Literature suggests that the 
funding of major airport developments is best sought through PPPs, trade sales and project 
finance privatisation (Graham 2003), and the above highlights what can go wrong when other 
modes of seeking project development are used. 
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A number of the airports studied have focused their management towards the efficiency seeking 
of operations management in the past, however the consistent growth in aviation over the last 
few decades has resulted in many airports pursuing the expanding and developing of new 
infrastructure.  The above mentioned case of Buenos Aires (AEP) is one such airport.  One airport 
that has had to return to an operations focus is Manila’s Ninoy Aquina International Airport 
(MNL), which was originally under a 25 year BOT with Fraport AG to construct and operate a 
third terminal facility to enhance the airport’s long-haul capacity (Hooper 2002; Graham 2003).  
Before completion, the Philippine government expropriated the terminal after construction 
stalled from insufficient funding.  The lack of compensation from the Philippine government saw 
Fraport AG filing the matter to the World Bank’s court of arbitration, halting final construction 
on the facility (Fraport AG 2008).  The government is currently in the final stages of releasing the 
new terminal, after considerable troubles in construction after Fraport AG’s removal from the 
project.  The operator, Manila International Airport Authority, has shifted its focus from 
development to new avenues for increasing capacity and seeking improved efficiency from 
existing infrastructures. Switching its managerial focus to operations management, the challenge 
for the operator is now to maximise revenues for recouping development costs.  A future strategy 
for maximising operational efficiency while retaining government ownership would be to move 
to a managed contract strategy for privatisation, which fits with the expectations set by Carney 
and Mew (2003); utilising market institutional arrangements to achieve operational efficiency 
while leaving strategic coordination to government owners. 
5. Discussion and Implications 
It is interesting to note that when all 18 airports are mapped on the framework, the vast majority 
tend towards more government controlled arrangements than privatised.  This could mean that 
this is a beginning phase for privatisation and that countries want to do this carefully, such as 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, whose intentions have been to privatise but considerations for this 
decision have been running for years.  Alternatively this could also mean that the sample size 
needs to be increased to include more privatised airports.  Additionally, cases such as AEP show 
that when airport privatisation goes wrong, there may be a tendency for governments to reclaim 
control rather than retender contracts to market.  Further investigation into these areas is 
required to show the nature of how governments relate to the privatisation of airports, and what 
that implies for the privatisation process. 
The modes of privatisation that are pursued in the analysed cases are not as obvious or 
transparent as they first seem.  Agreements that first appear as using one mode of privatisation 
appear to behave (slightly or significantly) than the expectations set by Graham (2003) and 
Carney and Mew (2003).  By focusing on the ownerships structure and agendas of controlling 
actors, insights to how and why privatisation modes do not act as we expect them to come to the 
fore.  This suggests that managerial focus for airports is less tied to the modes of privatisation as 
first thought, and more reliant on the underlying agendas of controlling stakeholders, 
particularly owners and those that the airport is accountable to.  That is, although we know there 
are some types of privatisation arrangements better suited for specific functions than others, the 
underlying political, regulatory and ownership environments play significant roles in enabling 
chosen arrangements to succeed.  Additionally, some arrangements that, at first glance, appear 
inappropriate may very well be tailored to fit a unique contextual need through the manipulation 
of ownership or regulation.  This means further research on the roles of ownership, regulatory 
and political spheres on the success of different airport privatisation modes is needed. 
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Importantly, airports and governments can use this tool to identify where they sit against existing 
frameworks. By acknowledging where an airport operator sits in relation to its institutional 
arrangements and reporting responsibilities, insights for management may be gained for 
reviewing current management focus against the identified position, and appropriate 
expectations between airports and their governments can be highlighted.  
6. Conclusion 
Using the proposed framework provides a novel tool for mapping the privatisation of airports 
against expectations set by airport management and governance literature.  By dissecting the 
management focus with institutions of accountability, changes in past privatisation initiatives can 
be compared against one another, but more importantly, airports sitting distinct of normal 
expectations can be identified readily for further investigation. 
The individual context, or story, of each airport adds value to the mapping and investigation of 
the privatisation initiatives, each outlier providing adequate justification for why they sit distinct 
of the proposed framework.  Context appears to be a major factor for sub-optimal airport 
privatisation, with AEP the most unique example in this study.  The original agreement struck 
between the Argentine government and AA2000 stands out on the framework for focus, 
governance and accountability; while the agreement’s time horizon fits a development focus, its 
accountability to self means that AA2000 may not have had the oversight necessary to motivate 
results in delivery of service.  AEP’s new position, after renegotiation and partial expropriation, 
aligns accountability, privatisation level, and time horizon to fit the original intent of the 
privatisation initiative. 
Rather than using the framework as a tool for retrospective analysis decision makers can use the 
framework to better understand the ‘best fit’ of a particular arrangement to the context of an 
airport’s privatisation. For example, a government run airport that has infrastructure that meets 
forecasted demand may consider privatising to gain additional rents from the land or to enhance 
the price efficiencies to make the airport more attractive to airlines and passengers. Graham’s 
(2003) work would naturally suggest a managed contract to drill down on operational 
efficiencies, and Carney and Mew’s (2003) would suggest tendering for a relatively short term 
contract (less than 15 years). Depending on the political arena and/or regional growth strategies 
this may not be the best solution. 
By identifying the fit of the airport in the broader context of the region or even national system of 
airports, a government may find more value in not so obvious arrangements; such as long-term 
leasing agreements that still allow operational efficiencies but also place a strategic responsibility 
for the new airport operator to develop in parallel with the region’s growth.  Implicitly this type 
of arrangement suggests strong horizontal ties are needed between the new tenant and 
government agencies to ensure coordinated growth. Without recognising the need for 
accountability to ‘the group’ of airport stakeholders, leased airports and their regions are likely to 
face hardships when trying to coordinate development, such as adversarial encounters when 
trying to gain development approval. An example of one such adversarial encounter has been 
seen between Brisbane Airport and its local government, Brisbane City Council, when the airport 
operator was challenged in court over a development approval for retail type development 
within the airport boundary but close to an existing suburban retail centre. The court ruled in the 
operator’s favour, however both city council and airport operator have acknowledged the need 
for improved horizontal linkages between their respective organisations to ensure mutual 
benefits from future development in and around airports. Had their been better horizontal ties 
between the airport and its local stakeholders earlier, the nature of the encounter may have been 
very different, or the proposed development may have been presented in a form more acceptable 
to the airport’s neighbours. 
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Using this framework as a decision evaluation tool may be useful in future decisions for the 
selection of privatisation strategies for airports, however specific contexts may distort the scales 
of accountability and/or time context.  Much like using industry scans and strategic quadrant 
analysis for the strategic management of firms, this tool can be used as a diagnostic for both 
government and industry decision makers to evaluate the appropriateness of entering or offering 
an agreement. For example, governments are typically bound by checks and balances inherent of 
public accountability and transparency, reducing the ability of a government to match 
operational cost efficiencies of private firms. Likewise, firms entering into short term contracts for 
airport management should have little intent to affect the strategic direction of an airport, as its 
focus will typically be to build profits through operational efficiency and process management.  
Finally, governments should expect fully privatised airports to negotiate long-term development 
programs with their regions, as their long-term success will likely rely on adequate supporting 
infrastructure as both airport and region grow. 
These examples show the possible utility of this framework as both a proactive tool for 
developing privatisation plans, and as a reflective tool for private enterprise and governments to 
evaluate and predict likely management behaviour from different types of agreements. Before 
assumptions are made from this framework, considerations should include reflection on the 
contextual differences between theory and practice, and further mapping of airports and their 
operators against this framework is required to determine if findings can be generalised.  
Investigation is required to assess if agreements found outside of expected regions of the 
framework will have a generic implication on favouring one party, or both, or neither. 
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Table 3. Interpreted airport data 







The privatising of the airport (which is one 
airport in a small network included in the 
contract) appears grounded in the need to 
develop and refurbish infrastructure, so the 
initial intent of the privatisation of the airport 
is rationalised as being dominantly project 
oriented. The actual focus of the managing 
company however, is less clear.  AA2000 
appears to have focused more on focusing on 
operations as a way of improving its financial 
status before driving forward with the 
developing and refurbishing of the airport’s 
infrastructure. 
Market/To Self: 
It is likely that the company agreed to contract 
terms beyond its capability to deliver, and 
without strong oversight was able to move 
into an unsustainable economic position. 
Accountability for managed contracts is 
typically to the managing company’s 
ownership, so when the company was failing 
due to poor oversight, the government made 
what appears to be a savvy move to rectify 
issues of accountability while minimising the 






The actions of Auckland Airport’s 
management can only be described as 
strategic.  When AKL was fully privatised the 
opportunity to build early and reap profits 
from optimising airport operations later was 
realised.  The airport has undergone extensive 
upgrading in recent years, and now sees a 
transition from successful development to 
optimising the operation of the new 
infrastructure.  These actions are inherent of 
long-term lease agreements as identified by 
Carney and Mew (2003). 
Network/ To Group: 
There is ample evidence within planning and 
strategy documents to show a strong 
acceptance that the airport is tied to its users, 
neighbouring businesses, and national 
competitiveness. The operator is not only 
accountable to its owners but to the 
government through strict accountability 
laws, and to its local community through a 
mixture of tourism and employment related 
factors – due largely to the small population 
of the country and the nation’s core economic 






Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is identified as a 
key driver in the Dutch economy, and is 
considered one of the most important 
transport infrastructures in the Netherlands 
with its title of a ‘mainport’ for the country. 
Development is considerably integrated with 
regional infrastructure, and planning and 
development decisions are in line with 
national planning strategies for mobility and 
centralisation. 
Hierarchy/To Public: 
The Dutch government is well known for its 
deliberative checks and balances for planning 
and development decisions.  While Schiphol 
Group is removed from the internal checks of 
government, its planning and development is 






Operated under a 30 year Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) agreement, the airport has 
been built primarily as an upgrade from the 
old Ellinikon Airport as a strategy for regional 
growth and renewal. 
Hierarchy/To Public: 
Unable to fund the project fully, the 
government retains 55% ownership in the 
PPP, so there is a strong influence of 




UK  (BHX) 
Strategic/Project: 
The trade sale of the airport was to gain 
valuable expertise in long-term planning in 
aviation and to gain additional funding to 
seed development. The trade sale was to set 
up the airport for long-term business 
To Public/To Self: 
The airport was originally sold as a trade sale 
to a consortium of investors.  The government 
still has a dominant influence on the airport’s 
operation, as the consortium of buyers 
includes a government agency, which so 
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sustainability, but with the intent to improve 
the existing infrastructure also. 
happens to hold the majority share. While the 
agreement is classified as a trade sale, the 
ownership structure means that the 






Brisbane Airport is owned by the national 
government, however the long-term leasing 
agreement (50-99 years) makes the 
arrangement more like a full sale as the 
operator can develop new infrastructures to 
diversify and expand revenue streams.  
Development slated in master plans indicates 
large scale infrastructure development in the 
coming decades, and significant commercial 
developments to diversify revenues. 
Network/To Group: 
Policy for development explicitly states the 
need for external stakeholder engagement for 
master planning and major developments, so 
while the decision to approve plans ultimately 
rests with the Federal Government, local 
stakeholders play a significant role in the 
airport’s accountability structure. The five 
year planning ‘update’ cycle means that the 






The airport is operated by a PPP consisting of 
25% State ownership and the remaining 75% 
owned by Macquarie Airports. While there 
has been some development of new terminal 
facilities, the high level of competition 
encourages attention to building operational 
efficiencies to retain existing airport users. 
Concerns over night time flight noise has also 
relaxed pressure on the airport to continue 
developing new infrastructure. 
Market/To Self and Public: 
The terms of the managed contract for BRU 
place significant emphasis on meeting the 
demands of airport performance rather than 
external checks and balances. However the 
proximity of the airport to the surrounding 
urban environment has resulted in 
surrounding community groups having 
significant influences on discussions for 






The joint venture between Dusseldorf State 
Capitol (DSC) and three other private 
investors appears dominantly driven by 
project management concerns, however the 
strong influence of the government through 
DSC ties decision making interests to the 
broader strategic goals of the region. 
Network/To Group: 
The ability to integrate airline decision makers 
directly into the coordination of infrastructure 
development indicates the airport’s 
accountability beyond just regulation, 
corporate governance and its shareholders. 
Actively including horizontal actors in 
development actions supports the rationale 
for a more networked approach to governance 





Was Operations/Now Strategic: 
During its outsourcing of operations 
management, IND was able to identify and 
address several market vulnerabilities, and 
while the airport was streamlined for efficient 
operations the long-term success of the airport 
depended on a repositioning of the airport’s 
target market. Subsequent development of 
new facilities has retained existing and 
attracted new airport users, particularly in the 
freight industry as part of a diversification 
strategy.  The completion of the managed 
contract has seen the Indianapolis Airport 
Authority (IAA) return to run the airport. 
Was Market/To Self, now Hierarchy/To 
Public: 
During the managed contract and decision 
making for realigned airport strategy, market 
type forces dominated the decision making 
arena. With the return of the IAA to the 
airport’s management the accountability of 
the airport’s management has returned from 
meeting internal (contracted) KPIs to meeting 





Development and operation of new terminal 
facilities were outsourced to a private 
company via a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
arrangement.  This provides a diversified 
operations structure, where airport 
management is still the responsibility of 
government, however some critical services 
are now shared with the private sector. 
Hierarchy/To Public: 
The management of the overall airport area 
and operations is still controlled by the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, and 
accountability is reinforced into the public 
sector through the airport’s ownership by the 
City of New York. 
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Operations are outsourced via a 25 year 
concession agreement. The current operator is 
considered a specialist in operations 
management efficiency. Having lost the 
position as Bolivia’s preferred international 
airport, and the funding support that goes 
with that position, efficiency is key to the 
sustainability of the airport for passenger and 
cargo operations.   
Market/ To Self: 
The duration of the contract gives 
considerable time to retrieve profits from the 
concession agreement.  The focus towards 
profits from managing supply and demand is 
a trait of market driven decision making. 
While there is some oversight to government 
agencies due to the military presence at the 
facility, performance is predominantly 
measured against the internal (contracted) 





Was project oriented however now more 
operations focused due to community 
lobbying drawing so much negative attention 
to proposed development. Now more a 
refurbishment and optimise approach rather 
than develop, expand and increase revenue. 
Mixed To Public/To Self in Market: 
The concession arrangement in itself is a 
market contract set with the owner’s agenda 
for performance indicators.  The public’s voice 
was clearly considered in choosing not to 
pursue large scale development at Luton, so 
has pursued profits within its concession 







Was Project/ Now Operations: 
In response to the switching of the nation’s 
preferred gateway airport away from Manila, 
the operator has had to change its focus from 
project management to more operations 
management to optimise the existing facilities 
to ensure economically sustainable 
operations.  The stoppage to development and 
newfound focus to operational efficiency 
makes the arrangement appear better suited 
to more managed contract arrangements than 
a BOT. 
Market and Hierarchy/To Public and To 
Self: 
The BOT arrangement provided that the 
airport decision making would be dominantly 
private so ensure adequate return on 
investment for the operating company. 
However the ability of the government to 
influence the where aircraft go (to which 
airport) left residual power to the 
government, and hence the public.  While 
operational decisions are primarily now 
market driven, the political backlash evident 







The steady pace of development coordinated 
with local, regional and national growth and 
aviation strategies shows a clear acceptance of 
the airport’s strategic role in the region’s 
development.  Rather than being reactionary 
in development, such as the case of PVG, 
PEK’s management shows commitment to the 
long-term goals of the controlling 
government. 
Hierarchy/To Public: 
Accountability is suitably to the public sector, 
with direct steering of large scale decisions 
ceded to the Central Government.  The 
hierarchical arrangements for the airport’s 
decision making are evident in its 





In the short amount of time since opening 
(1999), PVG has grown from a single runway, 
single terminal airport into a three runway 
two terminal airport by mid-2008. With 
further terminal and runway developments 
scheduled to 2015, Shanghai Pudong 
International Airport is clearly focused 
towards delivering aviation infrastructure to 
meet the regional demands of growth. In 
other airport cases that were less tied to the 
growth of their regions it could appear that 
the development is strategic, fostering long 
term growth for the airport.  The regional 
focus of the airport, as a part of a wider 
system of regional growth, means that the 
Hierarchy/To Public: 
Accountability is clearly to the public sector, 
demonstrated through the government 
ownership of the SAA and the close decision 
making ties with the national aviation 
administrator and local government. The 
governance of the airport’s decision making is 
primarily hierarchical. While the ownership 
and operations have been divested from 
‘direct’ government control, the 
embeddedness of airport strategy with local 
and regional development strategies shows 
that more vertical, government based 
relationships are utilised for managerial 
decision making. 
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airport is less focused on its own strategy, and 
more at meeting the ‘external’ needs of the 
region, which fits well with the administrative 






There appears to be an emphasis on 
internalising airport operations through 
created subsidiaries, rather than outsourcing 
to external contractors. While profits are a key 
concern for the operator, the internalising of 
activities is likely to be a strategic move to 
control and coordinate activities at the airport 
with minimal red tape. The portfolio of 
infrastructure developments, demonstrate the 
operator’s commitment to a long-term 
strategy. 
Mixed Group/Market: 
The organisation and running of the operator 
is mixed between internal measures of 
performance, external compliance with 
Federal laws, and the provision of profits to 
the shareholders of the company.  While 
accountability appears to be to “the group” of 
airport stakeholders and shareholders, the 
strong internal controls and measures of the 
company shows strong ties to market based 
concerns, such as market volatility. This 
results in a market governed airport with 







Development activities have been made for 
both mid- and long-term returns on 
investment through infrastructure and 
commercial improvements.  High leasing 
rents and outlays for the Airport 
Development Program have resulting in 
higher rates and charges to airlines, increasing 
strategic concerns of future market 
attractiveness and long-term economic 
sustainability.  While marketing programmes 
are oriented to generating short-term 
economic gains, these are only to fill the 
capacity-demand gap created from new 
infrastructure development. 
Mixed Public/Market:  
Accountability is, by proxy, to the public 
sector, which is supported by the termination 
of private short-term financing arrangements 
when the airport was divested from 
government to airport authority control in 
1996.  Emphasis on the economic viability of 
the airport provides a shading of “self 
preservation” to the airport’s decision 







While project development has been a core 
part of the operator’s recent business dealings, 
its actions and leadership in operations and 
administration demonstrate a clear adherence 
to pursuing goals built of their own 
(Flughafen Zurich AG) strategy.  This is 
supported by the operator’s persistence for 
pursuing its strategic interests in court when 
met with opposition. 
Network/To Group:  
Flughafen Zurich AG is 35% government 
owned, so while accountability is to the 
shareholders of the company, the government 
holds a strong steering position in airport 
actions.  So while decisions are dominantly 
made to appreciate the needs of the business 
and its shareholders, there is some tempering 
of government influence through ownership. 
 
 
